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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the product safety regime in the European Union 
(“EU”) has been amended to provide increased stability for producers 
and more protection for consumers. The framework seeks to balance the 
interest of consumers in having access to safe products with the interest 
of producers in avoiding costly litigation due to differing national 
standards. There are currently three prominent EU directives designed to 
protect the health and safety of consumers. These three directives are the 
Product Liability Directive (the “Directive”), the European General 
Product Safety Directive (the “GPSD”), and the Product Warranty 
Directive.1 This paper will focus on the impact of the Directive and the 
  
 1. The European General Product Safety, Product Liability & Product 
Warranty Directives, Emergo Grp.,  
http://www.emergogroup.com/resources/articles/other-european-directives (last visited  
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GPSD in the EU and will compare these two directives with product 
liability law in the United States (“U.S.”). This paper will also explore 
the newly proposed Product Safety and Market Surveillance Package 
(the “Package”), expected to replace the GPSD as soon as 2015, and the 
impact that the Package will have on product liability law in the EU.2  
The combination of the Directive and the GPSD provide a 
comprehensive scheme for product liability law in the EU. When 
compared with U.S. product liability law, these two directives achieve 
greater harmonization across member states than the current U.S. product 
liability regime. Although both the EU and the U.S. have similar product 
liability laws, the current EU regime often affords consumers greater 
access to redress and maintains strict requirements in regards to product 
labeling. The proposed Package will introduce even more harmonization 
into the EU, making it harder on economic operators who sell or produce 
defective products to escape liability. However, the EU product liability 
regime is not without problems and there are multiple areas in which the 
U.S. product liability framework offers better alternatives and provides 
less confusion for manufacturers and consumers.  
I. THE PRODUCT LIABILITY DIRECTIVE (85/374/EEC) 
Prior to the implementation of the Directive, countries adopted 
differing product liability systems. Some countries adopted a fault based 
system for defective products, whereas others had in place a strict 
liability regime.3 These differing interpretations were the impetus for a 
new directive that would harmonize product liability law across all EU 
member states. Specifically, the Council of the European Union (the 
  
Feb. 11, 2014) [hereinafter Emergo Group]. 
 2. See Product Safety and Market Surveillance Package: Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic 
and Social Committee - More Product Safety and Better Market Surveillance in the 
Single Market for Product, COM (2013) 74 final (Feb. 13, 2013) [hereinafter  
Communication on More Product Safety]. 
 3. Council Directive 85/374/EEC, of 25 July 1985 on the Approximation of the 
Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning 
Liability for Defective Products, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29, 30 [hereinafter Product Liability 
Directive]. 
2015] Product Liability: Comparison Between the EU and U.S. Regime 887 
 
“Council”) believed that “existing divergences [in the laws] may distort 
competition and affect the movement of goods within the common 
market and entail a differing degree of protection of the consumer 
against damages caused by a defective product to his health or 
property.”4 Therefore, in September 1976, the European Commission 
(the “Commission”) began the legislative process of implementing the 
Directive.5 
On July 25, 1985, the Council issued the Product Liability Directive.6 
The Directive was eventually amended in 1999 to expand the scope of 
products covered to include agricultural products.7 This was the first 
piece of legislation introduced in the EU concerning a producer’s 
liability for harm caused by defective products. The Directive’s purpose 
was to impose liability without fault on all economic operators involved 
in manufacturing defective products.8 Article 1 of the Directive, which 
states, “[t]he producer shall be liable for damage caused by a defect in 
his product” encompasses the idea of strict liability.9 “Producer” also has 
an expansive definition and encompasses the manufacturer of finished 
products or components, producers of raw materials, individuals who 
place their name or trademark on products, individuals who import 
products into the EU for distribution, and product suppliers unless they 
can provide the injured consumer with the name of the producer.10 The 
Directive also requires the Commission to present reports on 
  
 4. Id. at 29.  
 5. Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Relating to the Approximation 
of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States 
Concerning Liability for Defective Products, O.J. (C 241) 9 (1976). 
 6. Product Liability Directive, supra note 3, at 29.  
 7. See Council Directive 1999/34/EC, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 10 May 1999 Amending Council Directive 85/374/EEC on the Approximation 
of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States 
Concerning Liability for Defective Products, 1999 O.J. (L 141) 20 [hereinafter 1999 
Amendment]. 
 8. Product Liability Directive, supra note 3, at 29. 
 9. Id. art. 1, at 30. 
 10. Id. art. 3, at 30-31. 
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implementation of the Directive every five years and make 
recommendations as to whether the Directive should be amended.11 
The Commission’s first report regarding implementation of the 
Directive was published on December 13, 1995.12 The report concluded 
that the Directive was generally well received and “has contributed 
towards an increased awareness of and emphasis on product safety.”13 
However, experience with the Directive was limited and the European 
Court had yet to hear a case concerning interpretation of the Directive.14 
To determine how the Directive worked in practice, the Commission 
carried out a study in the form of a Green Paper,15 which surveyed 
economic operators, consumers, insurance companies, and public 
administrators.16 The results of the Green Paper formed the basis for the 
Commission’s second report on implementation of the Directive and led 
to the 1999 Amendment.17  
The Commission’s second report on the Directive’s implementation 
was published on January 1, 2001 and examined the practical effects of 
the Directive as well as possible reform.18 The Commission found that 
the Directive worked well in practice and that member states generally 
implemented the Directive alongside other liability regimes, such as 
  
 11. Id. art. 21, at 33. 
 12. See Commission First Report on the Application of Council Directive on the 
Approximation of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States 
Concerning Liability for Defective Products (85/374/EEC), COM (1995) 617 final (Dec. 
13, 1995). 
 13. Id. at 2.  
 14. Id. 
 15. Green Papers are “documents published by the European Commission to 
stimulate discussion on given topics at European level. They invite the relevant parties 
(bodies or individuals) to participate in a consultation process and debate on the basis of 
the proposals they put forward.” Glossary - Green Paper, EUROPA,  
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/green_paper_en.htm (last visited Apr. 
17, 2015).  
 16. See Commission Green Paper on Liability for Defective Products, COM 
(1999) 396 final (July 28, 1999). 
 17. Commission Report on the Application of Directive 85/374 on Liability for 
Defective Products, at 6-7, COM (2000) 893 final (Jan. 31, 2001) [hereinafter Second 
Report]. 
 18. Id. at 12-27. 
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contract or tort law.19 The second report also considered how the 
Directive affected European businesses and their foreign competitors.20 
Although European businesses were not affected on a global level, the 
Directive was found to have a significant impact on European 
manufacturers operating in the U.S.21 Small and mid-size European 
manufacturers reported that they refrained from exporting products to the 
U.S. because U.S. law created a “climate of unpredictability” for 
producers given high punitive damage awards and the possibility of class 
actions.22 
The critical portion of the Commission’s second report was its 
discussion of reform. The first issue considered for reform was the 
burden of proof standard.23 Under Article 4, the injured party was 
required to prove damage, defect, and a causal relationship between 
defect and damage.24 However, the Commission found that it was often 
difficult to prove defect because of the product’s complexity or the cost 
of obtaining an expert witness.25 Multiple reforms ranging from inferring 
a causal relationship if an individual proves damages to requiring the 
manufacturer to pay the cost of an expert witness were presented as 
solutions.26 There were differing responses to the recommendations, with 
one group rejecting the idea of manufacturer liability based on 
presumptions and another advocating for the burden of proof to be 
placed on the manufacturer.27 After considering various options, the 
Commission recommended against amending Article 4 because there 
were no known problems relating to the current standard and national 
courts had developed various ways to deal with burden of proof issues.28 
The second issue addressed by the Commission dealt with Article 16 
of the Directive. Article 16(1) states that “[a]ny member state may 
  
 19. Id. at 8.  
 20. Id. at 9. 
 21. Id.  
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. at 13. 
 24. Product Liability Directive, supra note 3, art. 4, at 31. 
 25. Second Report, supra note 17, at 13.  
 26. Id. at 13-14. 
 27. Id. at 14. 
 28. See id. at 14-16. 
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provide that a producer’s total liability for damage resulting from a death 
or personal injury and caused by identical items with the same defect 
shall be limited to an amount which may not be less than 70 million 
ECU.”29 At the time of the Commission’s second report, only Germany, 
Spain, and Portugal had adopted financial ceilings.30 The Commission 
concluded that Article 16 should be left as an option for member states 
because there was no information indicating that the 70 million ECU 
threshold left consumers injured by defective products without 
compensation.31 The Commission ended its second report by determining 
that it would be unwise to amend the Directive given its limited 
experience with the Directive in practice.32 The Commission also 
advocated against amending the Directive because it wanted to maintain 
the balance struck by the Directive between consumers and 
manufacturers.33 
The Commission reexamined implementation of the Directive on 
September 14, 2006, when it published its third report.34 Between 2001 
and 2006, the Council and the Commission prepared two studies to 
outline the practical effects of the Directive in EU member states.35 The 
two reports adopted by the Commission were the Lovells Report, 
published in 2003, and the Fondazione Rosselli Report, published in 
2004.36 The Lovells study focused on different product liability systems 
in EU member states and considered “the extent to which there was a 
need to further harmonize product liability laws in the EU, or to make 
  
 29. Product Liability Directive, supra note 3, art. 16, at 32. 
 30. Second Report, supra note 17, at 20.  
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 28. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See Report from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament 
and the European Economic and Social Committee: Third Report on the Application of 
Council Directive on the Approximation of Laws, Regulations and Administrative 
Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for Defective Products 
85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985, Amended by Directive 1999/34/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 1999), COM (2006) 496 final (Sept. 14, 2006) 
[hereinafter Third Report]. 
 35. Id. at 5.  
 36. Id. at 6.  
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any amendments to the Directive.”37 The Lovells report found that the 
Directive was being implemented in the majority of member states and 
that the Directive provided a fairly uniform system of law on consumer 
protection and manufacturer liability.38  
The Fondazione Rosselli Report was carried out in order to assess 
Article 7(e) of the Directive, also known as the Development Risk 
Clause.39 The clause states, “[t]he producer shall not be held liable as a 
result of this Directive if he proves … that the state of scientific and 
technical knowledge at the time when he put the product into circulation 
was not such as to enable the existence of the defect to be discovered.”40 
Since the Directive was enacted, there has been much debate over 
whether this clause should be removed so as to allow consumers greater 
access to redress.41 However, manufacturers point out that removing 
Article 7(e) would “stifle innovation” and result in an increased number 
of product liability claims.42 The report concluded that Article 7(e) 
should be maintained as a defense because it struck the proper balance 
between manufacturer innovation and consumer access to redress.43  
The third report on implementation of the Directive concluded that 
member states were generally satisfied with the balance struck between 
consumer and manufacturer interests and that manufacturers had not seen 
an increase in the number of EU product liability suits.44 However, the 
report did find areas of confusion for national courts and began 
monitoring these areas to determine whether future amendments would 
be needed.45 First, the Commission reexamined the burden of proof 
standard to determine whether it unfairly disadvantaged consumers.46 
Notably, the Commission found no evidence that the standard was 
  
 37. Product Liability in the European Union: Lovells Report for the European 
Commission, at i, MARKT 2001/11/D (Feb. 2003). 
 38. See generally id. at 47-58. 
 39. Third Report, supra note 34, at 6. 
 40. Product Liability Directive, supra note 3, art. 7(e), at 31. 
 41. Third Report, supra note 34, at 6-7. 
 42. Id. at 7.  
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 9. 
 45. Id. at 8-11. 
 46. Id.at 9.  
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impracticable and left this area to national courts to adjudicate.47 The 
other area that the Commission concluded needed further study was the 
Article 6 concept of defect.48 Article 6 states,  
A product is defective when it does not provide the safety which a 
person is entitled to expect, taking all circumstances into account, 
including: (a) the presentation of the product; (b) the use to which it 
could reasonably be expected that the product would be put; and (c) the 
time when the product was put into circulation.
49
  
The Commission found that problems with the Directive’s definition 
led to confusion in national courts as to whether a product’s design 
should be taken into account and whether the court may engage in a risk-
utility analysis.50 For example, some member states, such as France, 
require only that a consumer show the product failed and caused harm, 
while in other states, such as the United Kingdom, courts require that the 
consumer identify the specific defect.51 Given the confusion among 
courts, there is reason to believe that the EU may amend this definition in 
the near future to achieve greater harmonization among member states. 
The most recent report published by the Commission on 
implementation of the Directive was released on September 8, 2011 and 
found that the Directive has been widely accepted in almost all EU 
members states.52 The report noted that between 2006 and 2011 there 
was an increase in product liability claims based on the Directive and 
that the Court of Justice of the European Union (the “Court”) had found 
  
 47. Id.  
 48. Id. at 10. 
 49. Product Liability Directive, supra note 3, art. 6, at 31. 
 50. Third Report, supra note 34, at 10.  
 51. Id.  
 52. See Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council 
and the European Economic and Social Committee: Fourth Report on the Application of 
Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the Approximation of the Laws, 
Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for 
Defective Products Amended by Directive 1999/34/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 10 May 1999, COM (2011) 547 final (Sept. 8, 2011) [hereinafter Fourth 
Report]. 
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ways to mitigate the differences in member state interpretations.53 The 
Commission also reiterated that the point of the Directive was to bring 
about a general framework of liability that provided adequate protection 
for consumers without stifling innovation and increasing costs for 
manufacturers.54 As such, the Commission decided not to amend the 
Directive because amendments could upset the balance struck by the 
Directive between manufacturers and consumers.55 Another report on 
implementation of the Directive is not scheduled to be undertaken until 
2016 in accordance with Article 21 of the Directive.56  
II. A COMPARISON OF THE EU PRODUCT LIABILITY DIRECTIVE AND U.S. 
PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW UNDER THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY 
This portion of the paper will examine the difference between product 
liability law in the EU under the Directive and product liability law in the 
U.S. under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability (the 
“Restatement (Third)”). While both systems have multiple similarities, 
including strict liability, there are some notable differences that 
manufacturers who wish to sell products under either regime should be 
aware of. Overall, it appears that the EU offers a more comprehensive 
product liability framework under both the Directive and the GPSD, 
which will be discussed later in this paper. However, there are areas in 
which the U.S. regime offers a better compromise between the interests 
of consumers and manufacturers. 
The first notable difference between EU and U.S. law is that in the 
United States there is no federal product liability statute.57 As a result, 
product liability law varies according to jurisdiction and theory of 
liability. However, there has been some harmonization of U.S. law, first 
  
 53. Id. at 4-5. 
 54. See generally id. at 9-11. 
 55. Id. at 11.  
 56. Product Liability Directive, supra note 3, art. 21, at 33. 
 57. Harvey L. Kaplan & Jon A. Strongman, Developments in US Product 
Liability Law and The Issues Relevant to Foreign Manufacturers, PRACTICAL LAW (Mar. 
1, 2012), http://us.practicallaw.com/6-501-9379#null. 
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under the Restatement (Second) of Torts and then under the Restatement 
(Third).58 Although no state is required to adopt the Restatement (Third), 
a majority of states have adopted many of its provisions.59 In comparison, 
the EU Directive is addressed to all members states and provides, 
“[m]ember states shall bring into force, not later than three years from 
the date of notification of this Directive, the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive.”60 
However, Article 13 also allows member states to have a system of 
liability under which both national laws and the Directive operate.61 
Overall, both regimes have sought to harmonize product liability laws. In 
the future, the U.S. should consider creating a federal framework 
applicable to all states so as to subject consumers and manufacturers to 
the same laws in all jurisdictions.  
In the U.S., Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
established strict liability for sellers of defective products.62 However, 
implementation of Section 402A became problematic for a number of 
reasons, including its definition of unreasonably dangerous and its 
inability to deal with design defect claims.63 Sections 1 and 2 of the 
Restatement (Third) maintain the strict liability framework for 
manufacturing defects but allow individuals to bring both design defect 
and warnings claims under a negligence-based framework.64 Section 1 
states “[o]ne engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing 
products who sells or distributes a defective product is subject to liability 
for harm to persons or property caused by the defect.”65 Following the 
U.S. lead, the EU adopted a version of the Section 402A theory of strict 
liability in the 1985 Directive. Article 1 of the Directive maintains that 
  
 58. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. INTRO. (1998). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Product Liability Directive, supra note 3, art. 19, at 33. 
 61. Id. art.13, at 32. 
 62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 (a)(1) (1965). 
 63. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 1 cmt. a, reporter’s note cmt. 
a (1998). 
 64. Id. § 1, cmt. a. 
 65. Id. § 1. 
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“[t]he producer shall be liable for damage caused by a defect in his 
product.”66  
Although both the EU and U.S. initially developed product liability 
regimes based on strict liability, the evolution of the law in the U.S. and 
EU later diverged. Among the differences is how the EU and U.S. treat 
economic operators who supply defective products.67 In the EU, 
“producer” is broadly defined and includes anyone from the 
manufacturer of a finished product to individuals who import and 
distribute products.68 Article 3(1) and (2) of the Directive state, 
(1) ‘Producer’ means the manufacturer of a finished product, the 
producer of any raw material or the manufacturer of a component part 
and any person who, by putting his name, trade mark or other 
distinguishing feature on the product presents himself as its producer. 
(2) Without prejudice to the liability of the producer, any person who 
imports into the community a product for sale, hire, leasing or any form 
of distribution in the course of his business shall be deemed to be a 
producer within the meaning of this Directive and shall be responsible 
as a producer.
69
 
Further, if the product’s producer cannot be identified, the supplier 
may be treated as the producer unless he informs the consumers of the 
identity of the producer.70  
Similar to the EU Directive, §1 of the Restatement (Third) indicates 
that nonmanufacturing sellers and distributors, which include 
wholesalers and retailers, can be held liable for defective products.71 
However, these individuals are often shielded from strict liability under 
state law.72 The theory underlying this policy is that allowing individuals 
  
 66. Product Liability Directive, supra note 3, art. 1, at 30. 
 67. Id. art. 3, at 30-31; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 1, cmt. e 
(1998). 
 68. Product Liability Directive, supra note 3, art. 3, at 30-31. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id.  
 71. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 1 (1998). 
 72. Id. § 1 cmt. e. 
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to sue nonmanufacturing distributors would increase costs and produce 
more litigation.73 As a result, the EU regime likely provides greater 
redress for consumers injured by defective products because consumers 
may initiate an action against a supplier in cases where the manufacturer 
cannot be identified. In the U.S., state law often prohibits these suits, 
thereby precluding redress for consumers against nonmanufacturing 
distributors of defective products.74  
Another important difference between EU and U.S. product liability 
law is how the concept of defect is interpreted. In the EU, Article 6(1) of 
the Directive states, 
A product is defective when it does not provide the safety which a 
person is entitled to expect, taking all circumstances into account, 
including: (a) the presentation of the product; (b) the use to which it 
could reasonably be expected that the product would be put; (c) the 
time when the product was put into circulation.
75
  
Article 6(2) provides that “[a] product shall not be considered 
defective for the sole reason that a better product is subsequently put into 
circulation.”76 These provisions evidence that fact that the Directive is 
based on a consumer expectations test rather than a risk/utility balancing 
test. Risk utility focuses on whether a reasonable alternative design 
would have reduced the harm brought about by a defective product and 
whether that design would have introduced risk into other components of 
the product.77 A consumer expectations test focuses on whether the 
product was unreasonably dangerous to consumers and whether the 
product failed to meet a consumer’s reasonable expectations.78  
National courts have largely been left to interpret Article 6 and the 
concept of defect under the Directive’s consumer expectations test 
themselves. In A v. National Blood Authority, the plaintiffs sought 
  
 73. Id. 
 74. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 1 cmt. e, reporter’s note cmt. 
e (1998). 
 75. Product Liability Directive, supra note 3, art. 6(1), at 31.  
 76. Id. art. 6(2), at 31. 
 77. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. d (1998). 
 78. Id. § 2 cmt. g. 
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damages under Article 6 after contracting Hepatitis C from blood 
transfusions.79 The defendants argued that they were not liable because a 
screening test that would have detected such risks was not available at 
the time.80 The High Court of England and Wales inquired into whether 
the public knew and accepted the risk that a virus could be transmitted 
through blood transfusions.81 The court held that the transfusions were 
defective under Article 6 because the public could expect blood 
transfusions to be free of infection as the risks were not made known to 
the public at large and no warnings were issued.82  
In 2013, the German Federal Supreme Court issued a decision under 
the German Product Liability Act, which transposed the Directive. The 
plaintiff claimed that an under sink boiler was defective under Article 6 
when it exploded after being incorrectly fitted.83 Applying the consumer 
expectations test, the court found that the boiler was not defective 
because “the consumer could not reasonably expect a product to be 
safely designed for inappropriate use.”84 The court reasoned that 
incorrect use included inaccurately fitting the boiler.85 This case is an 
example of the practical effect of the consumer expectations test under 
Article 6 as it was transposed in national legislation. 
Notably absent from the Directive are the specific definitions of 
manufacturing defect, design defect, or warnings defect. Unlike the EU 
Directive, §2 of the Restatement (Third) lays out three categories of 
product defects. Section 2 states, 
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it 
contains a manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective 
because of inadequate instructions or warnings. A product: 
  
 79. A v. National Blood Authority (No.1), [2001] 3 All E.R. 289 (Eng.). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. 
 83. Shook, Hardy & Bacon, Product Liability Developments in 2013: What Do 
They Mean for Your Business?, THE IN-HOUSE LAWYER (Feb. 4, 2014),  
http://www.inhouselawyer.co.uk/index.php/product-liability/10405-product-liability-
developments-in-2013-what-they-mean-for-your-business. 
 84. Id.  
 85. Id.  
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(a) contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs from its 
intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the 
preparation and marketing of the product; 
(b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by 
the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a 
reasonable alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a 
predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission 
of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe; 
(c) is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when 
the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been 
reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or 
warnings by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the 
commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the instructions 
or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe[.]
86
 
In terms of a manufacturing defect, the U.S. invokes the consumer 
expectations test because manufacturing defects disappoint consumer 
expectations by being flawed, damaged, or inadequately assembled.87 
The test is whether the product departed from its intended design.  
For example, in Johnson v. Black & Decker Inc., the court considered 
whether a router contained a manufacturing defect after the plaintiff 
sustained injuries when the router failed to turn off.88 The plaintiff 
alleged that the router’s switch contained a manufacturing defect that 
caused the off switch to fail, subsequently causing the plaintiff’s injury.89 
The court reasoned that in order to prove that the router contained a 
manufacturing defect, the claim “must be supported by evidence that the 
allegedly defective product did not conform to the manufacturer’s own 
product standards.”90 The court held that the router did not contain a 
  
 86. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 (1998). 
 87. Id. § 2 cmt. c. 
 88. Johnson v. Black & Decker Inc., 408 F. Supp. 2d 353, 355 (E.D. Mich.  
2005).  
 89. Id. at 357. 
 90. Id. 
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manufacturing defect because there was no evidence that the router 
deviated from the manufacturer’s design.91 
Although similar in regards to manufacturing defects, EU and U.S. 
product liability laws depart substantially in terms of design defects. 
Unlike the consumer expectations test used in the EU, the overwhelming 
majority of states have adopted the risk utility approach advanced by the 
Restatement (Third) to adjudicate design defect cases.92 Whether a 
product has met consumer expectations is a factor to be considered but 
does not constitute an independent test for design defect.93 For example, 
in Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., the plaintiff alleged that his patrol car was 
defectively designed because it was not made with a continuous steel 
frame after the vehicle wrapped around a pole, crushing the lower half of 
the plaintiff’s body.94 In determining whether the car was defectively 
designed, the New Jersey Supreme Court identified several factors 
relevant to a risk utility analysis including: (1) the utility of the product, 
(2) the safety aspects of the product, (3) availability of a reasonable 
alternative design, and (4) whether the reasonable alternative design 
would introduce new dangers into the product.95 The court held that 
under the risk utility approach, the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence 
that a reasonable alternative design existed and that the defective design 
was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.96 Although the 
majority of states have adopted the risk utility test for design defect 
cases, there are states that use a mix of consumer expectations and risk 
utility or strictly apply a consumer expectations test.97 For example, in 
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co, the plaintiff was injured when the high 
  
 91. Id.  
 92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. g (1998). 
 93. Id.  
 94. Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 954 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 95. Id. at 957. 
 96. Id. at 958-60. 
 97. Aaron D. Twerski & James A Henderson Jr., Manufacturer’ Liability for 
Defective Product Designs: The Triumph of Risk-Utility, 74 BROOK. L REV. 1061, 1069 
(2009). 
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lift loader he was operating tipped.98 Plaintiff claimed that his injuries 
were caused by the loader’s defective design.99 The court held that,  
[A] product may be found defective in design, so as to subject a 
manufacturer to strict liability for resulting injuries, under either of two 
alternative tests. First, a product may be found defective in design if the 
plaintiff establishes that the product failed to perform as safely as an 
ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or 
reasonably foreseeable manner. Second, a product may alternatively be 
found defective in design if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product’s 
design proximately caused his injury and the defendant fails to 
establish, in light of the relevant factors, that, on balance, the benefits 
of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such 
design.
100
 
This case presents an example of a court using both consumer 
expectations and risk utility in a design defect case. In practice, the use 
of a consumer expectations test is outdated. As Professors Henderson 
and Twerski state, “there is little doubt that risk-utility balancing has 
carried the day . . . . The test for design defect set forth in the Products 
Liability Restatement merges sound legal theory and actual litigation 
practice.”101 
After a comparison between liability regimes, it appears that § 2 of 
the Restatement (Third) provides a more comprehensive definition of 
defect and eliminates much of the confusion prevalent under the 
Directive. The use of a risk utility balancing test rather than a pure 
consumer expectations test is more effective since consumers are 
generally unable to judge how an alternative design will affect the 
product’s overall safety or how a complex product should function. 
Furthermore, consumer expectations are subjective and courts often end 
up engaging in some form of risk utility balancing so that they may 
consider reasonable alternative designs. 
  
 98. Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 447 (Cal. 1978).  
 99. Id. at 445-46. 
 100. Id. at 455-56. 
 101. Twerski & Henderson, supra note 97, at 1106, 1108. 
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There are also similarities and differences in the way courts have 
interpreted burden of proof standards under the Directive and the 
Restatement (Third). In the EU, Article 4 places the burden on the 
injured individual to prove “the damage, the defect and the causal 
relationship between defect and damage.”102 However, it is often 
practically difficult to prove that a causal link exists because of a 
product’s technical complexity or the cost of expert testimony. As a 
result, member states have dealt with burden of proof issues in different 
ways.103 For example, in Belgium, courts will allow a judge to infer a 
causal relationship between damage and defect.104 In contrast, judges in 
Denmark establish burden of proof on a case-by-case basis and will ask 
the manufacturer to provide evidence to rebut the presumption of a 
defect.105 Therefore, although it appears that the Directive established a 
standard, in practice, courts often deviate to afford more protection to 
consumers and to compensate for the difficulty in proving defect. 
Similar to the Directive, the Restatement (Third) places the burden on 
the plaintiff to prove manufacturing and design defects.106 For 
manufacturing defects, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove that the 
product was defective when it left the manufacturer or commercial 
distributor.107 For design defects, the plaintiff is required to show that a 
reasonable alternative design was possible at the time of sale and that the 
alternative design would have made the product safer overall.108 
However, there are circumstances in which the plaintiff is not required to 
meet the standard, such as when evidence demonstrates that the defect 
existed at the time of sale and contributed to the plaintiff’s harm or when 
the product fails to perform its intended function and common 
experience leads to an inference that the product was defective.109  
  
 102. Product Liability Directive, supra note 3, art. 4, at 31. 
 103. Second Report, supra note 17, at 14.  
 104. Id.  
 105. Id.  
 106. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. c, d (1998). 
 107. Id. § 2 cmt. c. 
 108. Id. § 2 cmt. d, f.  
 109. Id. § 2 cmt. b.  
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Another notable similarity between the Directive and the Restatement 
(Third) is that both contain provisions relating to manufacturer defenses. 
Defense provisions are justified under the reasoning that manufacturers 
should be able to exonerate themselves from liability under the existence 
of certain circumstances.110 In the EU, Article 7 of the Directive governs 
the circumstances under which a manufacturer can avoid liability.111 
Article 7 states, 
The producer shall not be liable as a result of this Directive if he 
proves: 
(a) that he did not put the product into circulation; or 
(b) that, having regard to the circumstances, it is probable that the 
defect which caused the damage did not exist at the time when the 
product was put into circulation by him or that this defect came into 
being afterwards; or 
(c) that the product was neither manufactured by him for sale or any 
form of distribution for economic purposes nor manufactured or 
distributed by him in the course of his business; or 
(d) that the defect is due to compliance of the product with mandatory 
regulations issued by the public authorities; or 
(e) that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when 
he put the   product into circulation was not such as to enable the 
existence of the defect to be discovered; or 
(f) in the case of a manufacturer of a component, that the defect is 
attributable to the design of the product in which the component has 
been fitted or to the instructions given by the manufacturer of the 
product.
112
 
  
 110. See Product Liability Directive, supra note 3, at 30.  
 111. Id. art. 7, at 31. 
 112. Id. art. 7, at 31.  
2015] Product Liability: Comparison Between the EU and U.S. Regime 903 
 
Working in conjunction with Article 7(e), Article 15(1)(b) provides an 
exception that member states may enact to hold the manufacturer liable 
even when the state of scientific and technical knowledge would not 
enable a manufacturer to discover the existence of the defect.113 The 
listed defenses, in conjunction with Article 15(1)(b), reflect the emphasis 
the EU places on consumer protection.  
The German Case 5 U 3158/10, decided by the Munich Higher 
Regional Court, provides an example of a manufacturer asserting 
multiple defenses.114 The plaintiff was holding a glass bottle when the 
bottle exploded and sent a shard of glass into the plaintiff’s eye.115 The 
manufacturer argued that the bottle, which contained undetectable micro-
fractures, was not defective under Article 7(b) or 7(e).116 The 
manufacturer first argued that he was not liable under Article 7(b) 
because the defect in the bottle occurred after it was put into 
circulation.117 The court rejected this argument because the manufacturer 
was unable to present any evidence that the bottle had been damaged 
after leaving the manufacturer’s control.118 The manufacturer then argued 
that he was not liable under Article 7(e) because the state of scientific 
and technical knowledge at the time the bottle was manufactured could 
not detect the micro-fractures.119 The court also rejected this argument 
because “the risks of an exploding glass bottle were known and 
preventable by applying a protective coating.”120 The court ultimately 
found that the bottle was defective and that the manufacturer was 
liable.121 
  
 113. Id. art. 15(1)(b), at 32. 
 114. Shook, Hardy & Bacon, Product Liability Developments in 2011: What do 
they mean for your business?, THE IN-HOUSE LAWYER (Feb. 3, 2012),  
http://www.inhouselawyer.co.uk/index.php/product-liability/9757-product-liability-
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 115. See id.  
 116. See id.  
 117. See id.  
 118. Id.  
 119. See id. 
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In the U.S., defenses are governed by the Restatement (Third) and 
state and federal law. The most potent defense for manufacturers in 
product liability cases is preemption. Federal preemption is rooted in the 
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which states, “[t]his 
Constitution, and the laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme 
law of the land.”122 Courts recognize two types of federal preemption, 
express preemption and implied preemption. Express preemption occurs 
when a federal law or agency regulation explicitly states that the law 
supersedes contrary state law.123 Implied preemption falls into three 
categories: (1) field preemption, (2) direct conflict preemption, and (3) 
obstacle preemption.124 Field preemption occurs when a federal 
regulation is “so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that 
Congress left no room for the states to supplement it.”125 Conflict 
preemption occurs when it is impossible for a manufacturer to comply 
with both federal and state law.126 Lastly, obstacle preemption occurs 
when “state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of a federal law.”127 In 
deciding whether a state law is preempted, courts look at Congress’ 
reason for regulating, the regulatory history, the federal agency’s stance 
on the law, and state law.  
Federal preemption defenses appear to be the most common in motor 
vehicle, drug, and medical device litigation. The landmark Supreme 
Court decision on motor vehicle preemption is Geier v. Am. Honda 
Motor Co., in which the plaintiff brought a design defect claim, 
contending that Honda was negligent for failing to place driver side 
airbags in its vehicles.128 The manufacturer claimed that the design defect 
and negligence claims were preempted by Federal Motor Vehicle Safety 
Standard (“FMVSS”) 208, which required manufacturers to equip only 
  
 122. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 123. Lake v. Memphis Landsmen, LLC, 405 S.W.3d 47, 56 (Tenn. 2013). 
 124. Id.  
 125. Id.  
 126. Id. 
 127. Id.  
 128. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 865 (2000). 
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some of their vehicles with passive restraints.129 The Court held that the 
state tort claim was preempted by federal law because it conflicted with 
FMVSS 208 and the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 
which “deliberately provided the manufacturer with a range of choices 
among different passive restraint devices.”130 The Court has also 
considered whether preemption applies to medical devices. In Riegel v. 
Medtronic, the Court held that state law claims for defective medical 
devices are expressly preempted under the Medical Device Amendments 
if state law requires the manufacturer to deviate from any provisions of 
the Act or relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device.131 However, 
the Court took a different approach to pharmaceutical litigation in Wyeth 
v. Levine, when it held that there is no express preemption for drug 
claims.132 Although there is no express preemption, pharmaceutical 
claims may be impliedly preempted under federal law.133  
U.S. manufacturers may also defend against a product liability claim 
under the Restatement (Third).134 As the Restatement (Third) illustrates, 
a manufacturer will not be held liable if the plaintiff cannot establish that 
a defect existed when the product left the hands of the manufacturer.135 
Product misuse, modification, or alteration may also provide defenses 
against defective product claims. For example, if the misuse, alteration, 
or modification was unreasonable or unusual, a manufacturer has no duty 
to design or warn against risk.136 Additionally, product misuse, alteration, 
or modification might also be used as a defense to reduce the plaintiff’s 
recovery for comparative fault.137 
U.S. manufacturers also seek to defend against design defect claims 
on the ground that their product’s design is state of the art. “The term 
‘state of the art’ has been variously defined to mean that the product 
design conforms to industry custom, that if reflects the safest and most 
  
 129. Id. at 864-65. 
 130. Id. at 874-75. 
 131. See Reigel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 316 (2008). 
 132. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 581 (2009). 
 133. Mut. Pharm. Co. Inc., v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2013).  
 134. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. c, p, d (1998). 
 135. Id. § 2 cmt. c.  
 136. Id. § 2 cmt. p. 
 137. Id.  
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advanced technology developed and in commercial use, or that it reflects 
technology at the cutting edge of scientific knowledge.”138 The 
manufacturer may also introduce evidence that an alternative design was 
not practicable at the time of manufacture.139 However, conformance 
with state of the art design is not an absolute defense.140 In order to 
prevail on a design defect claim, the plaintiff must prove that the 
reasonable alternative design was or could have been available at the 
time of sale.141 Therefore, whether a product conformed to state of the art 
technology is relevant in determining whether an alternative design was 
feasible but is not dispositive.142 
The Restatement (Third) also contains a provision relating to 
inadequate warnings or instructions. Currently, a similar provision does 
not exist in the EU Directive. Section 2(c) of the Restatement (Third) 
provides that a product,  
[I]s defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when the 
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been 
reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or 
warnings by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the 
commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the instructions 
or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.
143
  
In order to prevail on a claim under §2(c), the plaintiff must prove that 
adequate instructions or warnings were not provided with the product.144 
In making a determination of whether a warning is defective, courts 
consider “content and comprehensibility, intensity of expression, and the 
characteristics of expected user groups.”145 Manufacturers must also 
warn about non-obvious and not generally known risks so that consumers 
can make an informed decision whether or not to continue using the 
  
 138. Id. § 2 cmt. d. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. reporter’s note §IV B. 
 141. Id. § 2 cmt. d. 
 142. Id.  
 143. Id. § 2(c). 
 144. Id. § 2 cmt. i.  
 145. Id.  
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product.146 However, manufacturers are generally not subjected to 
liability for failing to warn consumers of an obvious and generally 
known risk.147 
For example, in Moran v. Faberge, the plaintiff claimed that the 
manufacturer’s failure to place a warning on a cologne bottle regarding 
the product’s flammability was negligent.148 The plaintiff suffered 
serious burns after the cologne, which was poured on a lit candle, 
ignited.149 Testimony revealed that Faberge was aware of the hazard and 
foresaw that the cologne was likely to ignite when placed near an open 
flame.150 The court held that it was not necessary to prove that Faberge 
foresaw that the cologne would be poured onto a candle.  
[R]ather, it was only necessary that the evidence be sufficient to 
support the conclusion that Faberge, knowing or deemed to know that 
its Tigress cologne was a potentially dangerous flammable product, 
could reasonably foresee that in the environment of its use . . . this 
cologne might come close enough to a flame to cause an explosion of 
sufficient intensity to burn property or injure bystanders . . . .
151
  
This case provides an example of how courts interpret §2(c) of the 
Restatement (Third) in practice.  
By comparing the product liability regimes of the EU and U.S., one 
can see how consumers and economic operators are impacted by the 
practical effects of the Directive and the Restatement (Third). Overall, it 
appears that the Directive offers a more comprehensive scheme in 
regards to consumers’ access to redress for injuries from defective 
products. On the other hand, the use of risk-utility balancing in the U.S. 
affords manufacturers an opportunity to adequately defend against design 
defect claims and sets out an improved framework for adjudicating 
design defect cases. 
  
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. § 2 cmt. j. 
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III. THE GENERAL PRODUCT SAFETY DIRECTIVE  
Notably absent from the Directive is any mention of product warnings 
or recalls. While the Directive established strict liability for defective 
products, the GPSD was enacted to ensure general product safety and 
created a rapid alert system to facilitate the exchange of information 
between countries in case of defective products.152 As the Commission 
noted, the GPSD and the Directive have “a complementary function: the 
first instrument ensures that only safe products are put on the market 
(prevention); the second instrument establishes the rules under which 
personal injury and damage to property caused by a defective product are 
compensated (compensation).”153 Before examining the current GPSD, it 
is important to review its predecessor to understand how general product 
safety laws have changed overtime in the EU. 
A. The 1992 General Product Safety Directive (92/59/EEC) 
The first General Product Safety Directive (“1992 Directive”) 
introduced European member states to a general product safety 
obligation. The purpose of the 1992 Directive was to “ensure a 
consistent, high level of safety in respect of consumer products 
throughout the EU.”154 The directive was adopted on June 29, 1992 and 
was to be implemented in all member states by June 29, 1994.155 The 
1992 Directive sought to implement a broadly based, horizontal 
legislative framework that would harmonize member state legislation and 
  
 152. Emergo Group, supra note 1. 
 153. Second Report, supra note 17, at 21.  
 154. John Meltzer & Rod Freeman, Hogan Lovells Int’l LLP, The EU General 
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impose obligations on manufacturers to market safe products.156 Prior to 
implementation of the 1992 Directive, member states differed in their 
approaches to the marketing of safe products. For example, France, the 
United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands all had 
legislation placing a general obligation on manufacturers to put safe 
products on the market.157 Some countries, such as Belgium and 
Germany, had to expand previously adopted legislation to comply with 
the 1992 Directive.158 Others, such as Ireland, Greece, Italy, and Spain 
had no legislation and chose to adopt the 1992 Directive.159  
In order to harmonize general product safety across the EU, the 1992 
Directive focused on ensuring that only safe products were placed on the 
market. To do this, the 1992 Directive implemented Article 3(1), which 
states “[p]roducers shall be obliged to place only safe products on the 
market.”160 The 1992 Directive also established the Rapid Exchange of 
Information System (“RAPEX”) for products that pose “a serious and 
immediate risk.”161 RAPEX provides that when a member state has 
detected a serious and immediate risk to consumers, the member state 
should inform the Commission of the identity of the product and the 
danger, provide reasons why the product is dangerous along with any 
tests or relevant analyses, and state what measures should be taken to 
mitigate the harm.162 The Commission will then inform the relevant 
authorities in all member states of the danger posed by the product.163 
Overall, the 1992 Directive introduced into the EU general product 
safety alongside a sophisticated product alert system.  
Although the 1992 Directive’s effort to harmonize general product 
safety worked well in theory, in practice, the directive failed to achieve 
many of the goals it set out to accomplish. One of the biggest issues was 
  
 156. See Council Directive 92/59/EEC, of The Council of European Communities 
of 29 June 1992 on General Product Safety, 1992 O.J. (L 228) 24 [hereinafter 1992 
Directive]. 
 157. Commission Report on 1992 Directive, supra note 155, at 7. 
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 160. 1992 Directive, supra note 156, art. 3(1), at 26. 
 161. Commission Report on 1992 Directive, supra note 155, at 6.  
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that there was not a clear understanding among authorities or economic 
operators regarding which products were subject to community 
legislation and which products were governed by the 1992 Directive.164 
As a result, multiple product sectors were excluded from regulation, and 
authorities had a difficult time enforcing compliance.165 Problems with 
the 1992 Directive also arose in regard to the monitoring and withdrawal 
of defective products. Although the Commission’s report found that 
obligations for monitoring and withdrawal existed in all member states 
except France, the report concluded that these procedures were not 
followed in practice.166 The Commission noted that, 
[t]he absence of penalties for non-compliance with this obligation, 
ignorance of its existence and the lack of guidelines as to what has to 
be notified and the manner and time at which the notification has to be 
made may explain the failure to comply with an obligation which 
would however be very useful for the administration.
167
 
As a result, the relevant authorities and the Commission were unable 
to carry out withdrawals or inform other member states and consumers of 
product dangers.168  
The notification and rapid exchange of information system also 
contributed to the diminished effect of the 1992 Directive. Generally, 
member states reported that the Commission was slow to react to 
notification and failed to keep member states informed, resulting in states 
failing to learn of product defects until months or years after the initial 
report.169 Furthermore, the Commission was concerned that national 
authorities were having a difficult time keeping up with the amount of 
notifications, that failure to precisely define “serious and immediate risk” 
was significantly contributing to the lack of harmonization, and that there 
was a lack of clarity in the notifications the Commission did send out.170 
  
 164. Commission Report on 1992 Directive, supra note 155, at 9.  
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As a result, improvements to RAPEX were at the center of discussions 
for amending the 1992 Directive. 
B. The Current General Product Safety Directive (2001) 
The 1992 Directive was replaced with the current version on 
December 3, 2001.171 The GPSD entered into force on January 15, 2002 
and all member states adopted the directive by January 15, 2004.172 The 
GPSD significantly amended the 1992 Directive to impose more 
stringent obligations on economic operators and market surveillance 
authorities to correct many of the issues surrounding the RAPEX 
notification system. As attorneys John Meltzer and Rod Freeman note, 
“[t]he Directive marked a fundamental point of change in the approach to 
the regulation of the safety of consumer products . . . It brought with it an 
end to the ‘silent’ recall of consumer products in the EU, imposing 
onerous new obligations on suppliers of consumer products to EU 
markets.”173 Through amendments, the Council sought to increase 
compliance, clarify the scope of the GPSD, expand the power of market 
surveillance authorities, and create more effective procedures for 
monitoring and reporting.174 Overall, the GPSD instituted a more 
effective product safety regime in the EU. 
The first significant change brought about by the GPSD relates to the 
scope of products covered under the directive. Under the 1992 Directive, 
Article 2 included in its definition of product only “products intended for 
consumers or likely to be used by consumers.”175 Under Article 2(a) of 
the revised GPSD, the definition of product was expanded to include 
[A]ny product - including in the context of providing a service - which 
is intended for consumers or likely, under reasonably foreseeable 
conditions, to be used by consumers even if not intended for them, and 
  
 171. Council Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 3 December 2001 on General Product Safety, 2001 O.J. (L 11) 4 [hereinafter 2001 
General Product Safety Directive].  
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 173. Hogan Lovells, supra note 154, at 5. 
 174. Id.  
 175. 1992 Directive, supra note 156, art. 2, at 26.  
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is supplied or made available, whether for consideration or not, in the 
course of a commercial activity, and whether new, used, or 
reconditioned.
176
  
The effect of the amendment has been to broaden the scope of the 
GPSD and bring more products under its regime, ensuring that all 
products are governed by legislation that imposes a general safety 
obligation on economic operators. Notably, food and pharmaceuticals 
fall beyond the GPSD’s scope since these industries are governed by a 
separate product safety regime.177 
Article 2(b) of both the 1992 Directive and the current GPSD define 
the meaning of safe product.178 The 2001 amendments left this provision 
relatively unchanged, with the exception being that the GPSD defines 
“serious risk.” Article 2 states,  
Safe product shall mean any product which, under normal or 
reasonably foreseeable conditions of use including duration and, where 
applicable, putting into service, installation and maintenance 
requirements, does not present any risk or only the minimum risks 
compatible with the product’s use, considered to be acceptable and 
consistent with a high level of protection for the safety and health of 
persons . . . .
179
  
To determine whether a product is safe, economic operators take into 
account the product’s characteristics, the product’s effect on other 
products, the product’s presentation, the product’s labeling, warnings, or 
instructions, and the risk to consumers using the product, particularly 
children and the elderly.180 As mentioned above, the most significant 
change to this section of the GPSD was the inclusion of the definition of 
serious risk. Article 2(d) defines serious risk as “any serious risk, 
including those the effects of which are not immediate, requiring rapid 
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intervention by public authorities.”181 Although this provision sought to 
eliminate confusion over the differing interpretations of risk in member 
states, it is unlikely that the definition has met its goal. This vague 
definition provides little clarity regarding what constitutes a serious risk 
under the GPSD and leaves manufacturers and distributors free to 
interpret this provision a number of different ways. 
Article 5 of the GPSD, previously Article 3 of the 1992 Directive, has 
also undergone substantial revision. Article 5 focuses on the obligations 
of economic operators, other than simply placing safe products on the 
market, and introduces new and demanding obligations. Article 5 
reiterates that producers have an obligation to warn consumers about 
inherent products risks which are not “immediately obvious” and makes 
clear that the presence of warnings does not exempt a producer from 
liability.182 Copying language from Article 3 of the 1992 Directive, 
Article 5(1) states,  
Within the limits of their respective activities, producers shall adopt 
measures commensurate with the characteristics of the products which 
they supply, enabling them to: 
(a) be informed of the risks which these products might pose; 
(b) choose to take appropriate action including, if necessary to avoid 
these risks, withdrawal from the market, adequately and effectively 
warning consumers or recall from consumers.
183
 
Notably, the GPSD clarifies that producers have an obligation to 
“adequately and effectively” warn consumers about dangerous products 
or recall products directly from consumers.184 Under the 1992 Directive, 
producers only had an obligation to withdraw the product from the 
market and notify the Commission.185 This amendment appears to have 
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made the GPSD much more effective since consumers are being warned 
earlier about defective products. 
In addition to requiring that producers notify consumers directly, 
Article 5 also requires that producers take specific measures to ensure 
that dangerous products do not find their way onto EU markets. Article 
5(1) paragraph 4(a) requires that producers trace marketed products so 
that they can effectively monitor product safety. Appropriate tracing 
measures include “an indication, by means of the product or its 
packaging, of the identity and details of the producer and the product 
reference or, where applicable, the batch of products to which it belongs . 
. . .”186 The GPSD also requires that producers carry out sample testing, 
investigate and keep records of consumer complaints, and keep 
distributors informed of these activities.187 These measures seek to ensure 
that products placed on the market are continuously monitored for 
possible issues and alleviates much of the confusion over economic 
operators duties under the 1992 Directive. 
Distributors also have an obligation under Article 3(3) of the 1992 
Directive and Article 5(2) of the GPSD to ensure that products placed on 
the market comply with the general products safety requirements. Article 
5(2) makes clear that distributors are required to act with “due care” to 
ensure compliance with the directive.188 Under this obligation, 
distributors cannot supply products which they know or should know do 
not comply with the safety requirements.189 Distributors must also 
“participate in monitoring the safety of products placed on the market, 
especially by passing on information regarding product risks, keeping 
and providing the documentation necessary for tracing the origin of 
products, and cooperating in any action taken by producers and 
competent authorities to avoid risks.”190 This provision ensures that 
distributors function as an additional safeguard for consumers and as an 
alert system for producers. 
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9.  
 187. Id. art. 5(1) para. 4(b), at 9.  
 188. Id. art. 5(2), at 10.  
 189. Id.  
 190. Id.  
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The GPSD also made significant amendments to the obligations and 
powers of member states. Article 8 relates to the enforcement measures 
authorities are entitled to take to ensure compliance with general safety 
requirements. In regards to products placed on the market, Article 8(1)(a) 
authorizes authorities to organize safety checks, collect information 
regarding products marketed in the state, and take and conduct tests on 
product samples.191 Most importantly, unlike the 1992 Directive, the 
GPSD includes provisions relating to warning labels. Article 8(1)(b) 
provides that authorities may:  
(i) require that it [the product] be marked with suitable, clearly worded 
and easily comprehensible warnings, in the official languages of the 
Member State in which the product is marketed, on the risks it may 
present; (ii) to make its [products] marketing subject to prior conditions 
so as to make it safe.
192
  
The 1992 Directive provided only that “suitable warnings be affixed” 
to the product.193 Additionally, Article 8(1)(c) allows authorities to order 
economic operators to include special warnings for any product that 
could pose a risk to a particular subset of consumers.194 Lastly, 
authorities may order that defective products be temporarily or 
permanently banned from the market as a safety precaution.195  
The most significant amendment to Article 8 dealt with the power of 
market surveillance authorities when dangerous products have already 
been placed on the market. Under Article 8(1)(f), authorities may “(i) 
order and organize its [dangerous product] actual and immediate 
withdrawal, and alert consumers to the risks it presents; (ii) order or 
coordinate or, if appropriate, to organize together with producers and 
distributors its recall from consumers and its destruction in suitable 
conditions.”196 Under the 1992 Directive, national authorities had the 
power to organize the withdrawal and destruction of the product but were 
  
 191. Id. art. 8(1)(a), at 10.  
 192. Id. art. 8(1)(b), at 10.  
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not specifically granted the power to alert consumers.197 The GPSD 
explicitly gives national authorities the power to recall dangerous 
products and alert consumers of the risks.198 As a result, consumers 
receive greater protection against dangerous products since producers 
can no longer quietly initiate recalls. 
One of the most prominent issues that plagued the 1992 Directive was 
the fact that authorities within each member state did not have the 
resources to carry out their monitoring and enforcement obligations. As a 
result, Article 9 of the GPSD mandates that member states provide 
adequate resources to ensure effective market surveillance. Article 9(1) 
states, 
Member States shall ensure that approaches employing appropriate 
means and procedures are put in place, which may include in particular: 
(a) establishment, periodical updating and implementation of sectoral 
surveillance programs by categories of products or risks and the 
monitoring of surveillance activities, finding and results; 
(b) follow-up and updating of scientific and technical knowledge 
concerning safety of products; 
(c) periodical review and assessment of the functioning of the control 
activities and their effectiveness and, if necessary, revision of the 
surveillance approach and organization put in place.
199
 
Member states are also required to ensure that there are adequate 
channels through which consumers can submit product complaints.200 It 
is now unacceptable for member states to allow authorities to be 
understaffed or underfunded, which solves many of the problems that 
made national authorities ineffective under the 1992 Directive. In 
conjunction with requiring that national authorities have the appropriate 
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resources to carry out their obligations, Article 9(1)(a) -(c) provides a 
framework for how national authorities can carry out those obligations.  
The main RAPEX procedures established under the 1992 Directive 
were not substantially changed under the GPSD. However, the GPSD 
added provisions regarding notifications to other countries, non-member 
states, and the public. Article 12(4) states, “[a]ccess to RAPEX shall be 
open to applicant countries, third countries or international organizations 
. . . .”201 As a result, the Commission and the U.S. Consumer Product 
Safety Commission “routinely share information with each other about 
dangerous products and product recalls that come to their attention.”202 
The GPSD now also makes product safety information available to the 
public. Article 16(1) provides, 
[i]nformation available to the authorities of the Member States or the 
Commission relating to risks to consumer health and safety posed by 
products shall in general be available to the public . . . [T]he public 
shall have access to information on product identification, the nature of 
the risk and the measures taken.
203
 
The addition of these provisions provide a greater level of protection 
to consumers not just in the EU but throughout the world, and allows 
countries to work together to ensure that only safe products are placed on 
any market. 
Notably absent from any provision in the GPSD are penalties for 
breach of the general product safety requirement. Currently, penalties for 
breach of the GPSD are implemented by member states and vary 
considerably.204 For example, economic operators in the United Kingdom 
who breach the GPSD may be subject to fines up to 20,000 pounds or 12 
months in prison.205 In the Czech Republic, breaches can be penalized by 
a fine of up to CZK 50 million, 8 years in prison, or sanctions on the 
activity of the producer.206 In Sweden, economic operators can be subject 
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to a fine ranging from SEK 5,000 to SEK 5 million and an export 
prohibition.207 Given that penalties vary so widely across member states, 
the GPSD will likely be reformed to harmonize penalties and dissuade 
economic operators from breaching their obligations. 
On January 1, 2009, the Commission issued a report to the European 
Parliament and Council on the implementation of the GPSD.208 Overall, 
the Commission found that the GPSD has been effective in ensuring that 
only safe products are placed on the market. However, the Commission 
noted that there was concern over member states transposition of the 
directive.209 The report also raised the possibility of including more 
regional and international organizations into RAPEX.210 Most 
importantly, the Commission found that unlike under the 1992 Directive, 
economic operators have taken the GPSD seriously and have even 
implemented measures within their businesses to contain risks posed by 
dangerous products.211 However, the Commission did find that 
amendments could be made to the traceability provisions to make it 
mandatory for economic operators to put their contact information 
directly on the product or its packaging.212  
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EU PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW 
Although the GPSD was an integral step towards assuring increased 
consumer safety in the EU, reports from the Commission noted multiple 
areas under which the GPSD could be improved. As discussed above, the 
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Commission was most concerned over the traceability of products, 
penalties for non-compliance, and differing interpretations regarding the 
scope of the GPSD. In light of these concerns, on February 13, 2013, the 
Commission introduced a reformed Product Safety and Market 
Surveillance Package to the European Parliament, the Council, and the 
European Economic and Social Committee.213 Projected to come into 
force in 2015, the Package will significantly alter economic operators 
and market surveillance authority’s obligations.214 Some of the more 
notable measures include country of origin labeling, penalties for non-
compliance, repeat offender labeling, and new market surveillance and 
reporting obligations.215 The Package includes two new regulations 
which will be the focus of this section: the General Product Safety 
Regulation (“GPSR”), which covers all consumer products not regulated 
by sector specific regulation, and the Market Surveillance of Products 
Regulation (“MSPR”), which covers market surveillance and 
enforcement.216 The proposed Package also includes a Multi-Annual 
Action Plan for Market Surveillance that is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
A. The GPSR 
The first regulation of the proposed Package is the GPSR. Following 
the Commission’s report on implementation of the GPSD, the 
Commission held public consultations with national authorities, 
economic operators, experts, and consumer organizations concerning 
revision of the directive.217 Following these consultations, the 
Commission introduced the GPSR, which “imposes clear and detailed 
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rules which do not give room for divergent transposition by Member 
States.”218 The first change made in the proposed GPSR concerns the 
scope of the regulation. While the proposed regulation is similar to 
Article 2 under the GPSD, the GPSR lays out specific products to which 
the regulation will not apply including medicinal products, antiques, 
food, materials intended to come into contact with food, living plants and 
animals, feed, animal by-products and derived products, plant protection 
products, and equipment on which consumers ride or travel.219 The goal 
is to reduce economic operator’s confusion regarding which piece of 
legislation applies to their products. 
One of the most important additions to the proposed GPSR is the 
country of origin labeling requirement promulgated in Article 7. The 
requirement is part of a larger focus on ensuring traceability of products 
so that market surveillance authorities can be more effective in 
responding to defective product alerts. Article 7(1) states, 
“[m]anufacturers and importers shall ensure that products bear an 
indication of the country of origin of the product or, where the size or 
nature of the product does not allow it, that indication is to be provided 
on the packaging or in a document accompanying the product.”220 If this 
article is implemented, the likely effect will be a reduction in the number 
of instances where products reported to RAPEX do not contain the 
manufacturer’s information. Another benefit of this requirement is that it 
will be easier for market surveillance authorities and consumers to 
indentify the manufacturer in cases where there is no contact information 
or the product is imported from a country outside the EU. 
In addition to country of origin labeling requirements, manufacturers 
also have enhanced obligations under the proposed GPSR in regards to 
product labeling. Article 8(6) will require manufacturers to place a batch 
or serial number on the product that is “easily visible and legible for 
consumers.”221 The GPSR will also make it easier for consumers and 
market surveillance authorities to locate the product manufacturer by 
requiring that contact information be included with the product. Article 
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8(7) and Article 10(3) require that both the manufacturer and importer of 
a product provide their registered name or trademark, the address at 
which they can be contacted, and a single point of contact for their 
products.222 These requirements will also lead to greater consumer 
protection and more effective market surveillance authorities since the 
manufacturer of the product will be easily identifiable. 
The final significant provision introduced in the GPSR relates to 
penalties for non-compliance. Article 18 instructs member states to 
implement penalties for economic operators who do not comply with the 
regulations.223 Specifically, “[t]he penalties provided for must be 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive.”224 Article 18(2) also provides 
that, “[t]he penalties . . . shall have regard to the size of the undertakings 
and in particular to the situation of small and medium-sized enterprises. 
The penalties may be increased if the relevant economic operator has 
previously committed a similar infringement and may include criminal 
sanctions for serious infringement.”225 The possibility of large fines and 
criminal sanctions is likely to deter companies from paying multiple 
fines while continuously placing dangerous products on the market. The 
fact that the penalty would be proportionate to the size of the economic 
operator also adds an additional deterrence effect for large scale 
economic operators. The proposed GPSR has the potential to further 
enhance general product safety in the EU and makes the necessary 
changes to the legislative framework to resolve the problems currently 
affecting the GPSD. 
B. The MSPR 
The second proposed regulation in the Package is the MSPR. This 
regulation merges the market surveillance provisions of the GPSD, 
Regulation 765/2008, which sets out accreditation requirements for 
market surveillance authorities, and various other pieces of sector-
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specific legislation into one framework.226 The goal of the MSPR is to 
establish a coherent framework for market surveillance in one piece 
legislation.227 Similar to the GPSD, the MSPR will require that each 
member state establish a market surveillance authority and provide 
adequate resources so that authorities can carry out their obligations.228 
Authorities will be obligated to perform regular inspections on product 
characteristics, carry out documentary and laboratory checks, alert 
consumers of product risks, allow consumers to submit product 
complaints, and verify that corrective action is being taken by economic 
operators.229 Most importantly, authorities will now be allowed to enter 
the premises of manufacturers, importers, and distributors facilities to 
test products.230 Along with allowing authorities access to products, 
economic operators are required to provide the authorities with any 
documentation that is needed to carry out their obligations, including 
information that allows authorities to trace the product.231 These 
measures will help strengthen the market surveillance framework and 
provide authorities with more effective tools to ensure compliance. 
Market surveillance authorities will also have expansive power under 
the MSPR to remedy situations involving defective products. First, 
market surveillance authorities will be obligated to carry out a product 
risk assessment, taking into account any relevant tests that have already 
been conducted.232 If authorities find that the product presents a risk to 
consumers, they can specify the remedial actions that economic operators 
must to take within a specified period of time or carry out the remedy 
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themselves.233 Corrective action may include attaching warnings to the 
product, alerting consumers to the danger, temporarily preventing the 
marketing of the product, withdrawing or recalling the product, 
prohibiting the product from being placed on the market, or destroying 
the product.234 However, in cases of non-compliance regarding products 
that do not present a serious risk, authorities must allow an economic 
operator ten days to explain why action has not been taken.235 In the case 
of a product that poses a serious risk, authorities may take corrective 
action without first informing the economic operator.236 Additionally, if 
authorities have to take corrective action, the economic operator will 
bear the cost.237 These provisions will clarify much of the confusion 
prevalent under the GPSD and streamline the market surveillance 
process to make it more effective and easier to implement. 
The final improvement that will be brought about by the adoption of 
the MSPR relates to the exchange of information between members 
states, the Commission, and other countries. Although the MSPR will 
retain RAPEX, the notification system will be greatly improved so as to 
allow authorities to receive more detailed information about product 
defects. The MSPR proposes that each member state select a single 
contact point who will notify the Commission directly of actions taken 
by economic operators, market surveillance authorities, or external 
border controls.238 The RAPEX contact will have a duty to provide 
details regarding the nature and level of risk, any non-compliance with 
the regulation, the product’s identity, the product’s origin and supply 
chain, and any corrective actions taken.239 The Commission will then 
communicate the information to other EU member states and any 
countries that have signed an agreement to participate in the RAPEX 
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system.240 Overall, the MSPR will simplify the process for economic 
operators and facilitate greater cooperation between authorities. 
C. EU Parliament Endorsement and Conclusions about the 
Proposed Package 
The European Parliament Committee on the Internal Market and 
Consumer Protection voted to endorse the proposed Package on October 
17, 2013.241 Notably, the Committee on the Internal Market and 
Consumer Protection approved of the controversial country of origin 
labeling requirements and proposed that the Package include a voluntary 
requirement for an “EU safety tested” label.242 The endorsement also 
signaled support for provisions relating to penalties for non-compliance 
and suggested that the Commission create a “black-list” of economic 
operators who continuously breach the safety requirements.243 In general, 
the Package will strengthen market surveillance, reduce confusion, and 
provide consumers with an even greater level of protection against 
defective products.  
CONCLUSION 
After analyzing product liability laws in the EU and U.S., it becomes 
apparent that both regimes have taken significant steps to revise and 
implement laws that provide a fair balance between the interest of 
consumers and manufacturers. Although both product regimes were 
founded on the concept of strict liability, overtime evolution of the laws 
created distinct differences that both positively and negatively impact 
each regime. On the whole, it appears that the combination of the EU 
Product Liability Directive and GPSD provide greater harmonization for 
product liability law across all member states than the Restatement 
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(Third) does in the U.S. However, the EU regime is not without its faults. 
Although the regime may function better in terms of consumer 
protection, the U.S. regime under a risk utility analysis provides a more 
comprehensive and effective system for manufacturers than the EU’s 
consumer expectations test. This is one area that the EU should consider 
reforming when it looks to adopt the proposed Product Safety and 
Market Surveillance Package in 2015. The Package, composed of the 
GPSR and MSPR, will overhaul economic operator’s obligations and 
market surveillance provisions. Such reform will have a significant 
impact for consumers and economic operators in the EU.  
 
The original version of this Article has been shortened for 
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